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Within computational neuroscience, informal interactions
with modelers often reveal wildly divergent goals. In this
opinion piece, we explicitly address the diversity of goals
that motivate and ultimately influencemodeling efforts. We
argue that a wide range of goals can bemeaningfully taken
to be of highest importance. A simple informal survey con-
ducted on the Internet confirmed the diversity of goals in
the community. However, different priorities or preferences
of individual researchers can lead to divergent model evalu-
ation criteria. We propose that many disagreements in eval-
uating themerit of computational research stem from differ-
ences in goals and not from themechanics of constructing,
describing, and validatingmodels. We suggest that authors
state explicitly their goals when proposing models so that
others can judge the quality of the research with respect to
its stated goals.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
1.1 | Diversity of modeling goals
Models are essential for progress in neuroscience and exist in a variety of forms and flavors. Here wewill follow the
definition of ‘computational model’ inMerriam-Webster Dictionary (Webster, 2016): “a system of postulates, data, and
inferences presented as amathematical description of an entity or state of affairs”. Within neuroscience, suchmodels
come inmany flavors. Models can summarize existing data. They can jointly describe brain and behavior data. They can
express relations that can be tested in experiments and predict successful clinical treatments. Formulating a concrete
model can help uncover hidden assumptions and help assess the suitability of hypothesized relationships. Formulating
models can provide mathematical insights and simulating them can lead to systems that solve real-world problems.
Accordingly, there is a large community of neuroscientists who construct and usemodels.
As computational neuroscientists, we became interested in the goals ofmodelingwhenwenoticed stark differences
across models in different papers and fields of neuroscience. For example, when Kendrick studies nonlinearities in the
human brain, he cares most about macroscopic measurements andmodel interpretability (Kay and Yeatman, 2017).
When Paul studies representations decoded from the brain, he cares most about interpretability and representations
(Carlson et al., 2003). When Gunnar writes a paper about linear-systems explanations of eyemovements, he cares most
about behavior, mathematical simplicity, and the real-world relevance of the task (Orban de Xivry et al., 2013). One
might suspect that these differences in goals stemmerely from differences in modelingmethodology. However, when
Konrad writes a paper using the samemethodology as Gunnar (i.e. linear systems), he cares most about themodel being
the optimal solution to a computational problem (Kording et al., 2007). Thus, there appears to be a diversity of modeling
goals with real impact on the waywe organize our research.
Despite this diversity, outsiders often perceive computational neuroscience as being homogeneous. What unites
computational neuroscience is a commitment to an approach that combinesmathematical reasoning with computer
simulations. However, this approach is applied across a broad array of topics andwithin each topic, researchers strive
to achieve distinct goals. At Society for Neuroscience, computational approaches are often corralled out of ease
into a single section despite differing goals. When experimentalists add computation to papers or grants, they often
do so without choosing a goal first. Young scientists declare they want to do computation without first committing
to a goal. And lastly, when neuroscientists (admittedly insiders) write books, they tend to merge computational
approaches, despite vastly differing goals. This creates the false illusion of homogeneity of a field, whereas we believe
that computational neuroscience is, rather, the accumulation of the computational branches of many different fields.
The diversity of goals within computational neuroscience is not without consequence: we propose that many
disagreements in evaluating the merit of computational research stem from differences in goals and not from the
mechanics of constructing, describing, and validatingmodels. Goals affect the way science is reviewed. They form key
criteria (Blohm et al., 2018; Schrater et al., 2019) that inform both reviewers’ and editors’ decisions. Goals are implicitly
invokedwhen consuming and evaluating research, and therefore impact an article’s likelihood of success. Across several
disciplines, bothmeta-analyses and editorial comment (Bornmann et al., 2010; Byrne, 2000; Pierson, 2004; Thrower,
2012) provide evidence that editors’ and reviewers’ preferred goals are criteria to which authors must conform for
success1 . In our considerable experience as editors, we find that disagreement regarding what constitutes a worthwhile
1Examples of these preferences are not hard to find. For example, “Research doesn’t add value to the journal. Sometimes the findings of a research aren’t
appealing to the journals, especially if those findings do not really contribute to any advancement in their field. If this is the case, it’s likely that the paper
would be rejected.” (Mukherjee, 2018), and “It’s boring. ... The question behind thework is not of interest in the field. Thework is not of interest to the readers
of the specific journals.” (Thrower, 2012). Editors reject theory papers if theydonot directly explain empirical data. For example, atPLoSComputational Biology,
the criterion “Significant biological insight and general interest to life scientists” often excludes theory papers that do not prioritize biological realism.
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goal for modeling is one of themain drivers of paper rejections. We believe the problem is that editors’ and reviewers’
preferred goals are implicit. By making modeling goals explicit, authors, reviewers, and editors can start to find common
ground for themerits of a paper.
1.2 | A short list of modeling goals
To the extent that the goals we choose formodelingmatter, an important open question is: what exactly are these goals?
Examining a broad range of papers in computational neuroscience, we gleaned a variety of different modeling goals,
typically revealed in the Introduction, Methods, and Discussion sections (Blohm et al., 2018). While it is impossible to
produce an exhaustive list, we compile here a list of themost salient and common ones (Schrater et al., 2019).
• Useful (can be applied to other domains). Somemodels of the nervous system are also good at solving real-world
problems. Models can be evaluated in terms of how good they are at solving such problems. For example, a model
of the visual systemmight be able to solve challenging problems in computer vision (Fukushima, 1980; Serre and
Riesenhuber, 2004). This assumes that themodeled system in the brain is solving a problem that also appears in
technical systems.
• Normative (best possible given certain assumptions). Some models provide the optimal solutions to problems
that exist in the real world (Chater and Oaksford, 2000, 1999; Knill and Richards, 1996; Todorov and Jordan,
2002). Models can be evaluated in terms of howwell they represent an optimal solution to ameaningful problem.
Normativemodels are thus often used in domains where behavior or neural properties are expected to be optimal
or near optimal (Acuña and Schrater, 2010; Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Körding, 2007). For example, a model may ask
howwell peopleminimize energy whenwalking (Selinger et al., 2015). Thus, wemight ask whether amodel supplies
the optimal solution to a computational problem faced by the brain and how similar behavior is to these predictions.
A normative model can also ask whether the assumed principles underlying the optimality criterion are biologically
accurate. This assumes that we can understand the goals of a system and that we gain insight if a system appears to
optimize what it is expected to optimize (Barlow, 1961;Mayr, 2004).
• Clinically relevant (helps healthcare). Somemodels produce insights that are relevant for developing or evaluating
clinical interventions. Models may be evaluated in terms of how well they generalize to medical problems. For
example, simulating individual differences with respect to electrical stimulation enables us to place electrodes to
maximize stimulation outcome (Bai et al., 2019). Given the potential to reduce human suffering, there is no doubt
that clinical relevance is a meaningful goal. In order for modeling insights to transfer tomedicine, a model must be
sufficiently similar to the real system.
• Inspire experiments (untested assumptions, new hypotheses). Some models change the way we think about a
problem and thereby raise interesting new hypotheses via abductive inference (Josephson and Josephson, 1996;
Lombrozo, 2012). Models can be evaluated in terms of the richness of potential experiments they inspire. For
example, a model may suggest that spike timingmay affect plasticity and therefore lead to a broad set of tests (Dan
and Poo, 2004; Gerstner et al., 1996). A formal model might also uncover hidden assumptions that a fieldmakes
when considering a proposedmechanism. To inspire experiments, a set of potential models must be small enough
such that experimental tests aremeaningful.
• Microscopic realism (looks like the brain). Some models describe the microscopic properties of the brain, such
as synaptic, pharmacological, and cellular-level properties. Models can then be evaluated in terms of how well
they quantitatively describe those properties. For example, models may predict changes in synapses over time
(Zador et al., 1990). Commitment tomicroscopic realism assumes that microscopic properties can be sufficiently
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decoupled frommacroscopic properties such that a reductionist understanding of neural properties is possible
(Gillett, 2016).
• Macroscopic realism (looks like the brain at the population level). Somemodels describe properties of brain areas
and networks. Models can then be evaluated in terms of howwell they quantitatively describe those properties.
For example, models may predict the population activity of brain areas as measured by EEG (Al-Nashash et al.,
2004). Commitment tomacroscopic realism assumes that macroscopic properties can be sufficiently decoupled
from finer-scale, distributed properties (Bennett andHacker, 2003).
• Behavioral realism (looks like real behavior). Somemodels can faithfully describe and explain behavioral phenom-
ena. Models can then be evaluated in terms of how well they quantitatively account for behavior. For example,
models can predict the way we move our arm as a function of distance we need to travel (Harris and Wolpert,
1998). An approach based on behavioral realism supposes that behavior can be understood without a deeper
understanding of the brain and that compact models of behavior are possible (Green et al., 2010; Krakauer et al.,
2017; Tao et al., 2018).
• Representational (codes like the brain). Somemodels aim to use representations of information that are similar
to representations in the brain. Models can then be evaluated in terms of howwell they quantitatively describe
representations. For example, models predict that neurons in motor cortex have cosine tuning (Olshausen and
Field, 2004). Suchmodeling assumes that representations can be compactly understood and are the basis of the
phenomenawewant to understand (Churchland and Sejnowski, 1990).
• Compact (few short equations). Somemodels can be succinctly expressed inmathematical language and/or com-
puter code (Burgess, 1998; Li and Vitányi, 2019). Models can then be evaluated in terms of howwell they trade off
complexity against the quality of description of the phenomena. For example, Fitt’s law can compactly describe the
balance between speed and precision during handmovements (Fitts and Radford, 1966). This approach assumes
that the phenomenon of interest has a low-complexity description (Burgess, 1998).
• Analytically tractable (exact solutions exist). Somemodels are understandable throughmathematical equations
as opposed to numerical simulations. Models can then be evaluated in terms of howwell they can be analytically
solved. For example, models may allow the combination of cues with neurally realistic properties while being
analytically solvable (Ma et al., 2006). For scientists withmathematical training, an analytic approach provides a
more generalizable understanding compared to numerical models. An implicit assumption is that the system of
interest is sufficiently similar to the analytically tractable model such that analyzing one provides insights into the
other (Parker, 2012).
• Interpretable (relates directly to something the brain does). Somemodels are easily interpretedwith respect to
how they work (e.g. what outcomes they predict) and/or how the brain might implement the computations. Models
can then be evaluated in terms of howwell humans can interpret their meaning. For example, units in a simulated
systemmay have receptive fields similar to those of real neurons (Blohm et al., 2009; Olshausen and Field, 2004).
For many scientists, prioritizing the interpretability of a model makes the model more relatable to their way of
thinking about the brain.
• Beauty (elegant). Some models may be symmetrical, balanced, or resonate well with the way we think. Models
can then be evaluated in terms of howwell they resonate intuitively with their target audience. For example, the
samemodel can be presented in the languages of physics, math, and biology, and can be distinctly useful for these
different communities (Chandrasekhar, 2013; Russell, 2019).
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F IGURE 1 Survey demographics. Shown are counts of survey participants binned by career stage (left) and counts
of papers rated by survey participants binned by journal (right).
2 | METHODS
To assess modeling goals in the computational neuroscience community, we constructed an online survey using Google
Forms. Each of the authors then contacted colleagues via personal e-mails, mailing lists, and Twitter. We collected
survey responses for approximately amonth, with a survey deadline of August 31, 2018. We told participants that we
would be releasing the responses from this survey as a public resource (with the exception of e-mail addresses, which
would be kept private). People contactedwere free to decline participation in the survey. Only adult scientists were
allowed to participate. The research was approved by the UPenn IRB (Protocol number 830156).
The survey asked each participant to choose up to 3 papers they authored or co-authored and to rate each paper on
the 12modeling goals described above. Participants were instructed to submit papers representative of distinct types
of their research. The full set of survey questions and survey results are available at https://osf.io/pqe7f/. We
note that the survey results may be useful for answering a variety of additional questions not addressed in this paper.
For example, onemight be interested to compare one’s prediction of themodeling goals held by a given researcher to
the actual goals held by that researcher. Or as another example, onemight be interested to seewhere one’s goals fall
relative to the group norms.
For the analyses performed in this paper, ratings were aggregated across papers (251 papers from 113 distinct
authors; 22 female, 91 male). For Figure 2B, a small amount of Gaussian noise (mean 0, standard deviation 0.5) was
added to the data prior to computing summary statistics in order to avoid discretization effects.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | A simple survey provides evidence computational researchers have diverse goals
To empirically assess modeling goals, we conducted an informal online survey in which we asked authors to rate their
ownmodeling work with respect to the goals listed above. Participants rated up to 3 of their authored papers on each of
the 12 goals, indicating the importance of each goal. We obtained results from 113 distinct authors who rated a total of
251 papers (Figure 1). On average, interpretability was rated as themost important modeling goal, whereas clinical
relevancewas rated as least important (Figure 2B, black bars). In addition, we found large variance of ratings across
papers (Figure 2B, gray error bars), suggesting that there is, indeed, wide diversity of modeling goals in the neuroscience
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F IGURE 2 Modeling goals in the computational neuroscience community. We conducted an informal survey on the
Internet to assess themodeling goals that different researchers held for specific papers that they authored. (A)
Histogram of results. For each of 12modeling goals (dimensions), we plot a histogram of the reported ratings. Values
range from 1 (completely irrelevant) to 5 (absolutely essential). Dimensions are ordered according to three conceptual
groups that seem intuitively reasonable. (B) Summary statistics. For each dimension, we plot themedian (black bars),
interquartile range (gray error bars), and bootstrapped 68% confidence interval on themedian (red error bars). (C)
Pairwise correlation (Pearson’s r) of dimensions across all papers.
community. Not surprisingly, some goals are highly correlated (Figure 2C), such as compactness and tractability.
To better understand the underlying structure of the ratings, we subtracted the average rating of eachmodeling
goal and identified a lower-dimensional space using probabilistic principal components analysis (Figure 3A).We recon-
structed the data in this lower-dimensional space and recomputed the pairwise correlation structure (Figure 3B). Finally,
we re-ordered themodeling goals, revealing three groups or clusters (Figure 3C). One simple interpretation of these
clusters is that people are sampling independently mixed contributions from three clusters that somewhat overlap with
the intuitive grouping of Scientific impact, Biological realism, and Style (as shown in Figure 2A). These differencesmight
represent different subfields of neuroscience having different modeling goals and/or different types of models naturally
fulfilling certain goals more readily than others. However, this lower-dimensional reconstruction accounted for only
51% of the total variance in goal ratings. The remaining 49% of the variance reflects diversity of individual preferences
in goals. Thus, just like the contrast between Gunnar’s and Konrad’s linear-systemsmodels, the variability in modeling
goals between researchers appears to be high.
To further illustrate diversity, we visualize the location of each paper in the space spanned by the first three
principal components (Figure 4). This shows again that despite dimensionality reduction accounting for roughly half
of the variance, there are no discernible clusters or groups in this subspace. In other words, there is a continuum of
preferences with respect to modeling goals that span the space. Highlighting the authors’ own papers in Figure 4 allows
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F IGURE 3 Groups of modeling goals. We performed probabilistic principal component analysis to characterize the
latent covariance structure of the survey ratings. (A) Component loadings. The top three components (composing an
orthonormal basis) are shown; the order of dimensions is the same as in Figure 2. (B) Data reconstruction. We
reconstruct the original data using the three identified components and recompute the pairwise correlation as in Figure
2C. The correlation structure is similar to that of the original data, but stronger due to the dimensionality reduction. (C)
Grouping of dimensions. We re-plot the results of panel B, re-ordering dimensions to highlight the block structure.
Thick gray squares indicate three groups of dimensions that appear to be present in the data.
several additional observations: (1)Most of the authors’ papers’ goals are fairly polarized, i.e. they reside at the edges
of the space spanned. (2) Konrad’s and Gunnar’s papers lie in diametrically opposite sides of this space despite some
overlap in modeling techniques used. The same is true for Paul’s and Kendrick’s papers. (3) Somewhat surprisingly,
Paul’s andGunnar’s goals (and Kendrick’s and Konrad’s goals) align fairly well despite apparently different technical
approaches used. Note that this diversity in goals and approaches does notmean that we do not appreciate each other’s
research efforts; quite the opposite! We view this diversity as a strength (see Discussion).
3.2 | Limitations of the survey
Of course, this survey is not intended as a formal scientific instrument to identify modeling goals in the field, but the
results do suggest that it would beworthwhile to invest inmore systematicmeta-scientific analyses. It would be valuable
to identify modeling goals for amuch larger sample of papers and to calibrate the survey and analysis methods. Our
sample is small and not randomly drawn from the population. The survey questions themselves may not have been
understood in exactly the sameway by different participants, whichmay have increased the apparent diversity. But the
survey is sufficient tomake our point: diversity in modeling goals is real and high!
4 | DISCUSSION
4.1 | Goals matter to howmodeling is done
The choice of goals matters in just about every imaginable way for modeling in neuroscience. Modeling goals affect
the overall utility and interpretation of a model by influencing the evaluation metrics, the choice of model type, and
the way we replace models with newer, better models. For example, if microscopic realism is required, this severely
constrains the types of modeling techniques that can be used. Some research fields have implicit agreements on a set
of desirable modeling criteria. For instance, historically, the eye-movements field has used linear-systems theory to
model saccades: the field has beenmost concerned with behavioral realism, usefulness, inspiration of experiments, and
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F IGURE 4 Diversity of modeling goals within and across authors. Here we plot all recorded paper ratings in the
space defined by the first three principal components (see Figure 3A). (A) Space defined by components 1 and 2. Each
gray dot indicates a single paper, and coloredmarkers indicate papers from the authors. Insets show raw ratings for
example papers; in these plots, thin gray lines indicate themean of each dimension across all papers. Some authors are
consistent across papers they write (Schrater, Kay), whereas other authors showmore diversity in their papers
(Kording, Blohm). Furthermore, there is high diversity in modeling goals across the four authors of this paper. (B) Space
defined by components 1 and 3. Same format as panel A.
interpretability, but has not placedmuch value onmicroscopic realism. If the field had been concerned with microscopic
realism, the linear-systems approach would have likely been inappropriate and a different toolset—such as spiking
neural-networkmodels—would have been used instead. Thus, getting clarity onwhywemodel may be just as important
as understanding themechanics of how to model.
4.2 | Butwhat are the goals of computational neuroscience?
In shaping our list of goals of computational neuroscience, we drew from our own experience: this is thus an opinion
piece in which we try to provide ameaningful perspective to the field. We combine 7+ years of teaching students the
broad range of modeling techniques useful in movement science and extensively discussingmodeling objectives at the
Summer School in Computational Sensory-Motor Neuroscience (CoSMo, http://www.compneurosci.com/CoSMo/)
and beyond. That being said, while goals in neuroscience are diverse as we have shown, we cannot claim that our list is
exhaustive or that other neuroscientists would not structure it differently. Even if our views are wrong, we hope that
our humble paper will jump-start a drive towards clarity in modeling goals in neuroscience.
4.3 | Authors should state goals; readers should evaluate based on those commitments
Why does it matter that different researchers have different modeling goals? We wish to raise awareness because
diversity often leads to significant tension and misunderstandings between researchers. For example, a reviewer
might have a certain set of goals associated with a particular modeling approach and might evaluate a given paper
outside of the authors’ intentions. This out-of-scope evaluation is one of the most frequent and frustrating reasons
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for miscommunication in computational neuroscience. Its consequence is often paper rejection. We argue that this
behavior is detrimental for science.
What are some practical steps we can take? As action items, we suggest that (1) authors should explicitly spell
out their goals, ideally in multiple instances across the Introduction,Methods, andDiscussion sections (Blohm et al.,
2018; Schrater et al., 2019), and (2) readers should deliberately evaluate a given paper within those constraints. For
example, an author might include a section that begins, “In this paper, we sought to satisfy the criteria of X, Y, and Z. It is
not our goal to develop amodel that exhibits properties A, B, and C for the following reasons...” We believe that explicit
characterization of goals leads tomore constructive interactions and therefore promotes scientific progress, discovery,
and societal impact.
This paper is itself a (rudimentary) modeling effort: we sought to characterize the intentions or goals held by
computational neuroscientists in conducting their research and the relationship of these goals to one another. Thus,
in a sense, this is behavioral research on how brains (scientists) function. With respect to the 12 modeling criteria,
we sought to characterize the phenomenon at the behavioral level, with some interest in identifying the underlying
representations (latent structure). Interpretability of our results was paramount, and we sought to gather observations
that may inspire further meta-scientific efforts. On the other hand, our investigation is obviously not intended to
understand the macroscopic or microscopic neural mechanisms underlying how scientists conduct their research.
Likewise, several modeling criteria are clearly not applicable to our study (e.g. normative, clinical).
4.4 | Diversity of modeling goals is a strength
Modeling aims to generate insight into a phenomenon of interest. Since models in computational neuroscience all
refer to brains, one could argue that they are guaranteed to produce synergistic answers and that the distinctions
highlighted in this paper are not that important. We think this stance is debatable. Models positioned at different
levels of biological realism (microscopic, macroscopic, behavioral, representational) are not guaranteed to inform each
other, as distinct phenomena may emerge at different levels. Models following different styles (compact, tractable,
interpretation, beauty) are optimizing different criteria, so amodel that fulfills one criterionmay be suboptimal under
other criteria. Models aimed towards a specific type of scientific impact (useful, normative, clinical, inspire) often fail
to deliver other types of impact. Thus, it is our contention that modeling goals are truly diverse and that models in
computational neuroscience are not aimed towards a single coherent class of answers.
Should the community attempt to converge on a single set of standards? While this might seem appealing to
some, actual diversity of modeling goals makes it difficult to find a shared community preference function. From
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Fishburn, 1970) to Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem (Fleurbaey, 2009; Harsanyi, 1979;
Weymark, 1993), arriving at a consistent group preference function is known to be hard, to require special conditions,
and even when possible, to require trading off individual preferences to allow a non-unique group preference as a point
on a Pareto front. Editor and reviewer preferences for goals are unlikely to represent such a hypothetical aggregate
preference, thus leading to idiosyncratic critiques (Garfunkel et al., 1990). Rather than encourage conformity to
particular preferences, appreciating goal diversity allows exploring possibilities without getting stuck in local minima.
For example, 15 years ago, some researchers were claiming that working on machine learning was career suicide;
researchers that nonetheless persevered are now superstars in the field.
We advocate embracing diversity in modeling goals as a strength for the field. As in other aspects of life, humanity
works best by respecting and not excluding diversity. In terms of scientific progress, diversity balances biases, provides
alternative views, encourages discussion, invigorates problem-solving, and facilitates specialization of individual re-
searchers, each of whom canmake distinct meaningful contributions to the field. Perhaps one day the neuroscience
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community will come to consensus on a single framework for describing and understanding the brain. But until that day
comes, embracing diversity and explicitly recognizing each other’s modeling goals will be critical for achieving progress.
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